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1. Introduction 
 
1a. Background and Literature Review 
 
Credit markets in developing countries can be divided into three broad categories: 
Formal, Semi-formal, and Informal Credit. Formal credit encompasses what we 
know to be conventional sources of credit such as large government and commercial 
banks. They tend to require forms of collateral and be governed on a federal or state 
level. Informal Credit encompasses individuals. They tend to use non-conventional 
forms of collateral such as social collateral to monitor loans. Semi-formal Credit 
includes sources that seemingly exhibit traits of both Formal and Informal Credit 
such as microcredit or microfinance. Research has largely been focused on the 
development of formal credit sources, but only recently has the focus shifted 
towards the informal sector.  
 
There are two leading views as to why formal and informal credit markets coexist. 
The first is a policy-based explanation that government regulations on the formal 
credit market have resulted in the resurgence of an informal credit sector1. The 
argument is that in imposing regulations such as interest rate ceilings on the formal 
sector the government actually limits the amount of lending that the formal market 
is willing to extend to the poor as the low rates prove to be unsustainable2. 
Borrowers then turn instead to informal sources of credit that are more accessible 
and not restricted by government policies. 
 
The alternative view is that information asymmetry exists for formal lenders 
regarding the creditworthiness of individuals. The difference in costs of screening, 
monitoring, and contract enforcement across lenders thus leads to fragmentation in 
credit markets3. Borrowers then turn to informal sources of credit that do not 
require conventional forms of collateral and use other means of monitoring. 
                                                        
1 Bell et al. 1997; Kochar 1997; Anderson and Malchor-Moller 2006 
2 Tang, et al. 2010 
3 Mohieldin, et al. 2000 
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1b. Research Question  
 
Current understanding of both views is still growing. The aim of this paper is to 
contribute to the understanding of the relationship between the formal and informal 
markets in Indonesia, and whether there exists any distinct patterns within interest 
rate movements. 
 
Indonesia is chosen as the focus of this paper as it boasts one of the most successful 
microfinance programs in the world. It has a fairly developed microfinance and 
microcredit sector run by large institutions such as Bank Rakyat Indonesia Unit Desa 
(BRI-UD) in addition to other government-sponsored semi-formal credit programs 
such as Badan Kredit Desa (BKD) and Pembinaan Peningkatan Pendapatan Petani-
nelayan Kecil (P4K).  
 
BRI-UD has enjoyed much success since its reformation in 1984 and has been 
steadily increasing its presence throughout the country. It is formally known as a 
Rural Financial Intermediary and works to service low-income rural families in 
Indonesia. While it started with a small subsidy in 1984, by the end of 1995 it had 
made a profit of about $170 million, was serving about 2.5 million borrowers, and 
no longer required a subsidy4. From 2000 to 2007, BRI-UD saw the number of loan 
accounts increase by about 30% from 2.7 million to 3.5 million accounts5. Part of its 
success stems from an innovative semi-autonomous structure that allows BRI-UD to 
operate as an independent profit center. It has also significantly broadened its target 
clientele to include the low-income rural population. 
 
Ultimately, the aim of this paper is to find out if amidst this expansion of formal and 
semi-formal credit institutions such as BRI-UD, whether there have been significant 
changes in interest rate patterns within credit markets in Indonesia, in particular 
focusing on changes in the informal credit markets. Should we observe some 
difference, the second question would then be to ask why such patterns exist and 
develop a greater understanding of potential relationships between factors. 
 
2. Methodology and Results 
 
 2a. Data Source 
 
Data regarding specific metrics of creditworthiness and of household credit sources 
in Indonesia remains limited. However, the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS)6 
provides a snapshot of a household’s main source of credit and the use of that credit. 
                                                        
4 Yaron, et al. 1997 
5 Seibel, et al. 2009 
6 Conducted by RAND, the center for Population and Policy Studies (CPPS) of the 
University of Gadjah Mada and Survey METRE. 
3 
 
The ongoing survey spans multiple years of data collection, with IFLS 1 completed in 
1993-4, IFLS2 and 2+ in 1997 and 1998, IFLS3 in 2000, and IFLS4 in 2007-8.  
 
 2b. Determining Interest Rates 
 
Data was pulled from the two most recent surveys (IFLS3 and IFLS4) pertaining to 
household borrowing history. Monthly Interest Rates were then backed out from 
questions bh11, bh20 and bh21 in IFLS47 as well as questions bh14, bh17, bh18 and 
bh20 in IFLS38 using the following formulas: 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 =
𝑏ℎ21 − 𝑏ℎ11
𝑏ℎ11
 
 
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑏ℎ20
 
  
The mean interest rates were then tabulated against their source and any large 
differences examined and further tested for statistical significance. 
 
Monthly Interest Rates 2000 2007 Change (%) 
Landlord 0.722% -15.625% -16.347% 
Money lender 14.799% 13.561% -1.238% 
Arisan 3.607% 2.555% -1.052% 
Government/semi-government bank 2.145% 2.000% -0.145% 
Neighborhood association 2.015% 2.587% 0.572% 
Small farmers group (kelompok petani kecil) 1.477% 2.170% 0.693% 
Private commercial bank 2.753% 4.129% 1.377% 
Office 0.422% 1.999% 1.577% 
Shopkeeper 1.000% 3.250% 2.250% 
Other -0.321% 2.722% 3.043% 
Cooperative bank 2.080% 5.922% 3.841% 
Non-gov't organization 2.446% 6.288% 3.842% 
Agricultural bank 0.000% 4.406% 4.406% 
Employer 0.830% 126.030% 125.200% 
 
  
                                                        
7 See Figure 3 in Appendix 
8 See Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix 
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2c. Robustness Testing for Statistical Significance 
 
T-tests were run on all samples with null hypothesis being no observed change in 
the interest rates between previous and current samples. Of note, only cooperative 
banks showed a statistically significant increase in interest rates from 2000 to 2007 
at the 5% level. 
 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  
     Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.01844709 0.045176489 
Variance 0.00270127 0.028913719 
Observations 528 245 
Pooled Variance 0.010996779 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 771 
 t Stat -3.297362436 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000510344 
 t Critical one-tail 1.646832373 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.001020687 
 t Critical two-tail 1.963045614   
 
It is interesting to also note that there were no changes for all other loan sources, in 
particular that of moneylenders (refer to table below). With the steady expansion of 
microbanking units and formal lending sources, the expectation is that some change 
be observed as a result of increasing competition and crowd-out. A variety of other 
factors however could have contributed to the non-result and thus nothing 
conclusive can be stated herewith. However this might prove an interesting 
question to pursue and consider with the availability of more data and ability to 
isolate variables. 
 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  
   
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 0.146360138 0.1984913 
Variance 0.033600588 0.01010786 
Observations 61 47 
Pooled Variance 0.02340563 
 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 
df 106 
 
t Stat -1.7556551 
 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.041017998 
 
t Critical one-tail 1.659356034 
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P(T<=t) two-tail 0.082035995 
 
t Critical two-tail 1.982597262   
 
 
3. Discussion 
 
In order to determine potential reasons behind the increase in interest rates of 
Cooperative Banks, various aspects of the loan were considered and regressed 
against monthly interest. Potential factors considered included the location of the 
household (urban vs. rural), the size of the loan, the duration of the loan, and the 
purpose of the loan, as well as other contextual and regulatory factors. 
 
3a. Location of the household (Urban vs. Rural) 
 
A t-test was first run on the mean interest rates of those who had borrowed from 
cooperative banks in either urban or rural locations to determine if there was a 
significant difference between the two. Data was pulled from Book K, question 
SC059. Results suggest that there was no significant difference between the two 
samples. 
 
 
To further determine the explanatory power of the location of households on 
interest rates, a regression of location against monthly interest rates was also run. 
Data also suggested that there was almost no correlation between the two, 
indicating minimal explanatory power. Thus location was not a factor in why 
interest rates might have increased. 
                                                        
9 See Figure 4 in Appendix for relevant question 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.3731         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7462          Pr(T > t) = 0.6269
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      464
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                                      t =  -0.3238
                                                                              
    diff             -.0095576    .0295154                -.067558    .0484428
                                                                              
combined       466    .0592151    .0141764    .3060262    .0313574    .0870729
                                                                              
       2       169    .0653066    .0351798    .4573372   -.0041448     .134758
       1       297     .055749    .0097749     .168458    .0365118    .0749861
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest monthly_interest, by (sc05)
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3b. Size of the loan 
 
A t-test was first run on the mean size of loans taken out from all the different 
sources across the two periods to determine if there was a significant difference 
across time. Data was pulled from Book IIIB question BH1410 and Book II question 
BH1111.  
 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  
     Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 1613550.09 8814540.424 
Variance 7.55765E+13 7.52281E+14 
Observations 3331 2125 
Pooled Variance 3.39111E+14 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 5454 
 t Stat -14.08479678 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 1.39539E-44 
 t Critical one-tail 1.64513306 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 2.79079E-44 
 t Critical two-tail 1.960399039   
 
The test was then further isolated to encompass only those that had borrowed from 
cooperative banks. Results suggest that there had been a significant increase over 
                                                        
10 See Figure 1 and 2 in Appendix for relevant question 
11 See Figure 3 in Appendix for relevant question 
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time in the size of loans that individuals were taking out overall, as well as from 
cooperative banks. 
 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  
     Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 923780.7775 3398329.96 
Variance 3.37248E+12 3.38681E+13 
Observations 926 494 
Pooled Variance 1.3975E+13 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 1418 
 t Stat -11.88078788 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 2.10807E-31 
 t Critical one-tail 1.645928924 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 4.21614E-31 
 t Critical two-tail 1.961638359   
 
To further determine the explanatory power of the size of the loan on interest rates, 
a regression of size of loans against monthly interest rates was then run. Data here 
suggested that there was very little correlation between the two, indicating minimal 
explanatory power. Thus while there had been a significant increase in the size of 
loans that people were taking out over time, it was probably not a key factor in why 
interest rates might have increased. 
 
 
 
3c. Duration of the loan 
 
A t-test was first run on the mean duration of loans taken out from all the different 
sources across the two periods to determine if there was a significant difference 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0217516   .0019214    11.32   0.000      .017982    .0255212
        bh14    -3.45e-09   9.44e-10    -3.66   0.000    -5.30e-09   -1.60e-09
                                                                              
monthly_in~d        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3.83156396  1242  .003084995           Root MSE      =  .05527
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0099
    Residual    3.79072773  1241  .003054575           R-squared     =  0.0107
       Model    .040836232     1  .040836232           Prob > F      =  0.0003
                                                       F(  1,  1241) =   13.37
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1243
. regress monthly_interest bh14
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across time. Data was pulled from Book IIIB question BH1712 and Book II question 
BH2013. 
 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  
     Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 13.34487458 21.62574365 
Variance 151.0644723 3364.448601 
Observations 1786 1849 
Pooled Variance 1785.618249 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 3633 
 t Stat -5.906613928 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 1.90657E-09 
 t Critical one-tail 1.645273159 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 3.81315E-09 
 t Critical two-tail 1.960617177   
 
The test was then further isolated to encompass only those that had borrowed from 
cooperative banks. Results suggest that there had been a significant increase over 
time in the duration of loans that individuals were taking out overall, as well as from 
cooperative banks. 
 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  
     Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 10.92085258 15.56652361 
Variance 62.28888325 2319.381587 
Observations 563 466 
Pooled Variance 1084.244197 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 1027 
 t Stat -2.252808979 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.012240803 
 t Critical one-tail 1.646338683 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.024481606 
 t Critical two-tail 1.962276567   
 
To further determine the explanatory power of the duration of the loan on interest 
rates, a regression of duration of loans against monthly interest rates was then run. 
Data here suggested that there was very little correlation between the two, 
indicating minimal explanatory power. Thus while there had been a significant 
                                                        
12 See Figure 1 and 2 in Appendix for relevant question 
13 See Figure 3 in Appendix for relevant question 
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increase in the duration of loans that people were taking out over time, it was 
probably not a key factor in why interest rates might have increased. 
 
 
  
3d. Purpose of the loan 
 
Data on the purpose of the loans were pulled from Book IIIB question BH1514 and 
Book II BH1815.  The relationship between the source that households borrowed 
from and the purpose for which they borrowed for was then examined further. The 
expectation is that there should be some relationship between the two, which is 
likely dependent on characteristics and nature of the loans. To simplify 
interpretation of the results, the data was further collapsed into broader categories.  
 
The sources of the loans were collapsed into the following categories based on 
preexisting designations as defined by Mohieldin and Wright (2000)16. Refer to 
Figure 3 in Appendix for an overview of all the loan sources listed within the survey. 
 
i. Formal Lending 
 
Formalized institutions governed on a federal or state level that tends to 
require collateral for loans. Encompasses source 1 (Private Commercial 
Banks), 2 (Cooperative Banks), 3 (Government / semi-government banks), 
and 4 (Agricultural Banks). 
 
ii. Informal Finance at the Corporate Level 
 
This refers to informal finance that takes a corporate form. These may be 
family or business partnerships that started by using their own funds for 
lending but expanded by accepting deposits in the form of cash certificates 
                                                        
14 See Figure 1 and 2 in Appendix for relevant question 
15 See Figure 3 in Appendix for relevant question 
16 Mohieldin, et al. 2000  
                                                                              
       _cons     .0302024   .0028452    10.62   0.000     .0246206    .0357843
        bh17    -.0011163   .0002123    -5.26   0.000    -.0015328   -.0006997
                                                                              
monthly_in~d        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3.83156396  1242  .003084995           Root MSE      =  .05496
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0210
    Residual    3.74808621  1241  .003020215           R-squared     =  0.0218
       Model    .083477749     1  .083477749           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,  1241) =   27.64
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1243
. regress monthly_interest bh17
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and cumulative deposits for specified periods. They tend to lend to high-risk 
borrowers who do not have access to formal intermediaries and to those 
who are geographically remote from formal services17. Encompasses source 
14 (Office) and 16 (Non-bank financial institution). 
 
iii. Occasional Lending 
 
This covers all direct intermittent loans by individuals with a temporary 
surplus of funds. These tend to be state contingent, with flexible terms and 
no collateral requirements18. Encompasses source 5 (Employer), 6 
(Landlord), 7 (Shopkeeper), and 8 (Non-government Organizations). 
 
iv. Financing through Collective Agreement 
 
This refers to situations where groups of individuals deposit funds with a 
chosen leader.  The pooled savings are then lent to group members (or, in 
some cases, nonmembers) when they apply for a loan. Members are typically 
charged little or no interest. Encompasses source 9 (Neighborhood 
Association), 10 (Arisan), and 11 (Small Farmers Group (Kelompok Petani 
Kecil). 
 
v. Regular Lending 
 
Similar to occasional lending, these individuals have a surplus of funds but 
are more specialized sources that deliberately and specifically function as a 
credit source. Encompasses source 13 (Money Lender) and 15 (Pawn Shop). 
 
Similarly, the purposes of the loans were collapsed into the following categories 
based on perceived similarity of loan characteristics. Refer to Figure 3 in Appendix 
for an overview of all the loan purposes listed within the survey. 
 
i. Lifecycle 
 
This refers to loans that are used to service specific one-off lifecycle-related 
ceremonies and proceedings. Loans tend to be consumption-based, fairly 
urgent, and may tend to present a temporary income shock to the household. 
Encompasses purpose 1 (Birth), 2 (Death), 3 (Marriage), 4 (Dowry), and 5 
(Social Ceremony). 
 
ii. Futures Improvement 
 
This refers to loans that are viewed as longer-term investments. Loans tend 
to be investment-based with some potential return on investment in the 
                                                        
17 Mohieldin, et al. 2000 
18 Mohieldin, et al. 2000 
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future to enhance future quality of life, and tend to present less of an income 
shock to the household as they are foreseeable. Encompasses purpose 6 (To 
buy household goods), 8 (Education), 10 (To buy a house), 13 (To buy land), 
17 (To buy / repair Becak), 20 (Material for Cottage Industry), 21 (Capital for 
other businesses), and 24 (To help household members, family or friends). 
 
iii. Improvement 
 
This refers to loans that are used for immediate improvement of quality of 
life. Loans tend to be consumption-based but should not present a large 
income shock to the household. Encompasses purpose 7 (Medication), 9 
(Home Renovation), and 25 (To buy or repair vehicle). 
 
iv. Consumption 
 
This refers to loans that are used for immediate consumption. Loans tend to 
be fairly urgent in nature, and may serve a consumption-smoothing purpose. 
Encompasses purpose 22 (Daily Expenses), 23 (Rotating Credit Association, 
Arisan), 26 (Debt Repayment), and 27 (Transport / travel). 
 
v. Futures Improvement (Agricultural) 
 
Similar to futures improvement, this refers more specifically to agricultural-
based activities and related spending. Encompasses purpose 11 (To buy 
agriculture inputs), 12 (To buy/repair agriculture equipment), 14 (To buy 
cattle), 15 (To buy inputs for poultry), 16 (Fishing Business), 18 (To 
buy/repair Boat), and 19 (To buy/repair fishing nets). 
 
A Chi-Square analysis was run on the variables as shown in the contingency table 
below to determine the strength of the relationship between them. The Chi-Square 
P-value is significant at the 5% level, thus showing an association between source 
and purpose of the loan.  
 
As expected, a higher percentage of those that went to formal lending sources to 
borrow used that loan for futures investment. Those borrowers seemingly favored 
formal lending sources for less urgent, longer-term borrowing purposes.  
 
The converse was also seen as a higher percentage of those that went to informal 
lending sources such as regular lending and occasional lending used that loan for 
consumption purposes. Those borrowers seemingly favored informal lending 
sources for more urgent, shorter-term borrowing purposes. 
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  Source of Loan 
 
Purpose of 
Loan 
Formal Lending 
Informal 
Finance at 
Corp Level 
Occasional 
Lending 
Financing 
through 
Collective 
Agreements 
Regular 
Lending 
Total 
Lifecycle 58.228% (46) 11.392% (9) 12.658% (10) 7.595% (6) 10.127% (8) 100% 
Futures 
Investment 
73.441% (683) 4.516% (42) 6.559% (61) 6.344% (59) 9.14% (85) 100% 
Improvement 69.524% (219) 10.476% (33) 9.524% (30) 5.714% (18) 4.762% (15) 100% 
Consumption 44.079% (201) 5.263% (24) 14.693% (67) 19.298% (88) 16.667% (76) 100% 
Futures 
Investment 
(Agriculture) 
65.116% (84) 2.325% (3) 10.853% (14) 14.729% (19) 6.977% (9) 100% 
Total 64.589% (1233) 5.815% (111) 9.534% (182) 9.953% (190) 10.110% (193) (1909) 
Chi-Square   
P-value 
1.76389E-29 
     
 
Having established a relationship between source and purpose of loan, a regression 
was then run with purpose of loan against monthly interest to determine the 
potential effect of a shift in borrowing purposes over time on monthly interest. Data 
here however suggested that there was very little correlation between the two, 
indicating minimal explanatory power. Thus while there exists a relationship 
between the source and purpose of the loan, this relationship does not seem to 
affect the change in interest rates that we have observed.  
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3e. Other Contextual and Regulatory Factors 
 
Given that there seems to be a lack of any quantifiable factors present within the 
loan structure that might be able to explain the increase in interest rates charged by 
Cooperative Banks, other external factors related to context and the general 
economic environment in Indonesia should also be considered. 
 
 Macroeconomic Environment in Indonesia 
 
While economically stable in the year 2000, Indonesia was still in a state of recovery 
following the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. Government and commercial 
banks survived, and interest rates on loans issued such as that of KUPEDES 
(“General Rural Credit”) by the BRI, had returned to pre-crisis levels19. There are 
multiple possible scenarios and explanations for why we observe an increase in 
interest rates as charged by Cooperative Banks, but there are two that seem most 
probable.  
 
Overall, it is possible that the rates observed in 2000 are actually artificially 
depressed in the wake of the financial crisis. It is possible that what we observe to 
be an increase from 2000 to 2007 is an increase in rates back to normal. It is thus 
likely that based on the nature of cooperatives, the depression in rates was 
deliberately done for the benefit of borrowers, to expand lending and ease the 
impact of the credit freeze on households. Goglio and Alexopoulos (2013) suggest 
that credit cooperatives may be less prone to raising the loan rate during periods of 
financial stress20, thus it is possible that cooperatives deliberately depressed 
interest rates for the benefit of borrowers. 
 
It is also possible that the downturn forced cooperatives to lower lending rates in 
order to increase demand and encourage consumers to continue borrowing from 
them. Seibel and Ozaki (2009) propose that the number of borrowers utilizing 
microbanking units actually fell in 1998 and 1999 from a decrease in demand 
related to a cautious attitude among the poor concerning an uncertain future21. Thus 
another potential explanation is that cooperatives adjusted their lending rates to 
meet the overall decrease in demand for credit. 
 
Decrease in demand 
 
Data from the survey further indicates that between 2000 and 2007 there seems to 
be a decrease in demand for loans from Cooperative Banks. Thus while inconclusive, 
it is possible that there exists some relationship between the overall demand and 
change in interest rates observed. The percentage of respondents that went to 
Cooperative Banks for a loan declined over time as shown in the table below. 
                                                        
19 Patten, et al. 2011 
20 Goglio, et al. 2013 
21 Yaron, et al. 1997 
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 % of respondents that went to source 2000 2007 Change in % 
Private commercial bank 4.68% 11.67% 6.99% 
Government/semi-government bank 19.70% 25.63% 5.93% 
Other 3.09% 5.76% 2.67% 
Money lender 5.61% 7.54% 1.93% 
Office 1.95% 3.70% 1.75% 
Small farmers group (kelompok petani kecil) 1.05% 1.50% 0.45% 
Shopkeeper 1.26% 1.50% 0.24% 
Agricultural bank 0.06% 0.28% 0.22% 
Landlord 0.24% 0.28% 0.04% 
Non-gov't organization 6.81% 3.37% -3.44% 
Neighborhood association 7.98% 4.50% -3.48% 
Arisan 7.23% 3.51% -3.72% 
Cooperative bank 27.77% 23.20% -4.57% 
Employer 12.44% 3.66% -8.78% 
Don’t Know 0.15% 
  
 
It should be noted however that the question itself relates only to the largest loan 
that a household has taken out in the last 12 months. Hence it is possible that overall 
demand has not changed, rather it is due to the fact that some responses are not 
captured within the scope of this survey. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this paper aimed to develop a better understanding of any interest 
rate changes within the informal credit markets in Indonesia. Overall, results 
indicate that there has been no change for interest rates across the different loan 
sources from 2000 to 2007 based on borrower responses, the only exception being 
that of Cooperative Banks. Results show that there is a steady increase in interest 
rates as charged by Cooperative Banks from 2000 to 2007 in Indonesia. However, 
there was a lack of explanatory factors that might help to illuminate the reason for 
this increase. Thus it is likely that potential macroeconomic factors are the cause of 
this increase.  
 
5. Further Research 
 
Going forward but beyond the scope of this paper, questions that deserve further 
examination include the lack of change in interest rates observed and the resulting 
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effect of the presence of formal credit institutions on informal credit institutions. 
Does introducing formal credit sources to underserved communities directly affect 
the behavior of preexisting informal credit sources in those locations? 
An empirical analysis and isolation of factors involving the introduction of formal 
credit institutions into certain locations might help to better elucidate the effect of 
introducing a formal credit institution into an underserved community. In a survey 
studying the unbanked in Indonesia, Johnston and Morduch (2008) found that while 
roughly 40 percent of poor households in Indonesia were judged creditworthy by 
the criteria set out by Bank Rakyat Indonesia’s microfinance unit, fewer than 10 
percent of poor households had actually borrowed from a formal bank or a 
registered microfinance bank. It suggests that there is still a large underserved 
population that exists within Indonesia, and more can still be done to test the direct 
implications of expanding access to such formal sources. 
Ultimately, the goal would then be to understand if the expansion of formal sources 
does in fact phase out the use of informal sources, and whether the adoption of 
formal credit is then a question of sustainability or accessibility. 
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